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IEEE 802.16e-2005 PKMv2 PROTOKOLÜNÜN STATİK ANALİZİ 
ÖZET 
 
IEEE 802.16e-2005, metropol (büyük şehir) alanlarında telsiz geniş bantlı internet 
hizmeti için bir hava arabirimi standardıdır. Wimax adıyla bilinen sertifikasyonun 
temeli olan ve telsiz internet alanında geleceği en parlak görülen IEEE 802.16 
standardının en son sürümü olan IEEE 802.16e, gezginlik ve güvenlik alanında 
iyileştirmeler ve yenilikler içermektedir. Telsiz internet teknolojisi yayınlama 
yöntemi kullandığı ve dolayısıyla uygun cihazlarla dinlenebildiğinden telsiz internet 
kullanıcıları, telli ağ kullanıcılarına göre daha fazla risk ile karşı karıyadır. Önceki 
IEEE 802.16 standartlarında güvenlik amacıyla Gizlilik ve Anahtar Yönetimi adlı, 
ancak ciddi kritik açıkları bulunan bir protokol kullanılmaktaydı. IEEE 802.16e-
2005'te ise bu protokolün yeni sürümü olan PKMv2 kullanılmaktadır. PKMv2 önceki 
sürüme göre köklü yenilikler içermekle beraber, önceki sürüme gelen ciddi eleştiriler 
yüzünden bilinen güvenlik önlemlerinin abartılı bir karışımı şeklinde yapılandırılmış 
haldedir. 
PKMv2 iki ana görev üstlenmiştir: paylaşılan bir asıllama anahtarı oluşturmak için 
kullanılan bir asıllama/yetkilendirme protokolü ve güvenlik ilişkilendirmesi trafik 
şifreleme anahtarının dağıtımı için kullanılan üç adımlı bir el sıkışma protokolü. Bu 
görevlerden ilki RSA ve EAP gibi yetkinliği ve niteliği bilinen yöntemlere 
bırakılarak iyileştirilmiştir. Bu tezin konusu, PKMv2'nin diğer görevi olan gezgin 
istasyonlar arası trafik şifreleme anahtarlarının dağıtımını sağlayan PKMv2 SA-TEK 
3W HS adlı el sıkışma protokolüdür. 
Protokollerinin güvenlik özelliklerinin doğrulanmasında başarıyla kullanılan 
yöntemlerden biri de statik analizdir. Bu çalışmada statik analiz tekniğinin modern 
bir telsiz ağ güvenlik protokolü olan PKMv2'de kullanımı gösterilmiştir. Çalışma 
sonucunda protokolde güvenlikten ödün vermeden performans arttırmaya dayalı 
iyileştirmeler elde edilmiştir.  
 xi 
ANALYSIS OF THE PKMV2 PROTOCOL IN IEEE 802.16E-2005 USING 
STATIC ANALYSIS 
SUMMARY 
 
The IEEE 802.16e-2005 specification provides an air interface standard for 
metropolitan area wireless broadband service.  IEEE 802.16 is the basis for WiMAX 
certification which is the next evolution in wireless technology while IEEE 802.16e 
addresses mobility and also enhances the security sublayer. Since wireless 
technology is broadcast and transmitted data can be intercepted, wireless users are 
more aware of the risks than wired users. The former IEEE 802.16 standards used the 
Privacy and Key Management Protocol which had many critical drawbacks. In IEEE 
802.16e, a new version of this protocol called PKMv2 is released. PKMv2 has 
radical changes and in contrast with the previous version it seems to have an 
exaggerated mixture of security features like nonces, message authentication codes, 
key ids, certificates, etc. 
The PKMv2 includes two main issues: an Authentication/Authorization protocol to 
establish a shared Authorization Key (AK), and a 3-Way Security Association (SA) 
Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) Handshake. The former is strengthened with RSA and 
EAP, therefore the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake (PKMv2 SA-TEK 3W HS), 
which is used for transferring TEKs to mobile stations (MS) after authentication will 
be the specific point of this thesis.  
Static analysis is successfully used for automatically validating security properties of 
classical protocols. In this thesis we will show how the very same technique can be 
used to validate modern wireless network security protocols, in particular, we study 
the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3W HS. 
We derived a model of the protocol and described it using LySa, a process calculus 
in the pi/spi calculus family allowing communication protocols to be specified and 
annotated for validation of authentication properties. After that, we carried out a 
static analysis of our LySa model using the static analysis tool LySa-tool. In 
conclusion we found improvements that increased the performance while being still 
secure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Security issues in wireless networks became a growing concern with the spreading 
growth on wireless communication in recent years. Wireless networks face more and 
especially different security threats than wired networks. However, IEEE 802.16, the 
standard for wireless metropolitan area networks (WMAN), incorporated a pre-
existing standard, DOCSIS (Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications), 
which was designed for cable networks. Therefore, IEEE 802.16 security failed to 
protect an IEEE 802.16 link [1] and had significant changes in its Privacy and Key 
Management (PKM) protocol with the latest standard IEEE 802.16e-2005 [2].   
The key distribution and management protocols which are used to establish secure 
communication between two principals, and authentication protocols which verify 
that the communicating principle is who it is supposed to be,  are one of the main 
issues that the applications of formal methods in the analysis of cryptographic 
protocols have been mainly concerned with. The tools that have been constructed 
based on the theoretical developments have successfully located subtle bugs in many 
cases, even in protocols that have been considered secure for several years and with 
great accuracy. One of the most famous success stories is Lowe's attack [3, 4] on the 
Needham Schroeder public key protocol [5] using CSP and the FDR model checker 
[6].  Also, Shmatikov and Stern [7] used Murphi and Corin et al. [8] used symbolic 
traces and PS-LTL successfully. 
In this thesis, a formal and automated method to verify the security protocol used in 
IEEE 802.16 is described and used. In particular, the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way 
Handshake is studied. 
1.1 Authentication Protocols  
An authentication protocol verifies the identity of principals by exchanging messages 
which have a specific form for authentication. These protocols usually have 
additional goals such as the distribution of session keys. Because of the illegitimate 
and malicious principals and active intruders authentication requires complex 
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protocols that are based on cryptography. The cryptographic protocols enable the 
principals to establish secure communications on insecure networks by using 
cryptographic functions and shared secrets for authentication and confidentiality. 
Generally, a trusted server (i.e. Key Distribution Center) is used for authentication 
protocols. The principals communicate with the server to make sure that the 
corresponding principal is authenticated. In addition, in most of the protocols the 
principals agree on a session key for that specific session. Since there exists a trade-
off between performance and security, the symmetric-key cryptography is used for 
all data traffic, and public-key cryptography is widely used for the authentication 
protocols themselves which aim to establish the session key. 
Session key is freshly created for each new connection and minimizes the amount of 
traffic that gets sent with confidential data like the users' secret keys or public keys, 
therefore reduces the amount of cipher text an intruder can obtain, and minimizes the 
damage in a case of intrusion. The loss of the session key is not as crucial as the loss 
of the secret key or any permanent key since the session key is renewed in each 
session [9]. 
Symmetric-key cryptography uses the same key for encryption and decryption. The 
notation between a simple encrypted communication between two principals is 
basically shown as: 
A  B : {M}K 
where principal A sends the message M by encrypting with the key K to principal B. 
Certainly, B must possess the key K in order to be able to decrypt and read the 
message M. 
Public-key cryptography or in other words asymmetric encryption is carried out 
using a private/public key pair e.g. K
-
/K
+
. The private key is kept secret whereas the 
public key is common knowledge. The messages that are encrypted using the private 
key can only be decrypted by using the public key, so all the principals possessing 
the public key can decrypt them. Likewise, the messages that are encrypted using the 
public key can be decrypted by using the private key, so only the principal 
possessing the private key can decrypt them. 
Description of asymmetric encryption is done in the following notation: 
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A  B : {|M|}K 
This is the description of the scenario where principal A encrypts the message M 
using his private key K
- 
and sends it to the principal B. To be able to decrypt the 
message, the principal B must possess the corresponding public key K
+
. 
A protocol is formalized as a list of correct message transfers. For instance, the 
following notation in Table 1.1 describes a variant of the Wide Mouthed Frog 
protocol (WMF) [10]: 
Table 1.1: The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol 
 
 
In this variant of the WMF protocol two principals A and B have shared master keys 
KA and KB with a trusted server S, and the protocol aims to establish a shared 
session-key K between two principals.  
In step 1, the principal A initiates the protocol by sending the message A,B,{K}KA to 
the server S. S possesses the shared master key KA, therefore S is able to decrypt the 
message and recognizes that A wants to arrange a secure communication with B 
using K as a session key.  
In step 2, S sends the message A,{K}KB to B. Having the key KB, B is able to decrypt 
the message and retrieve the session key K.  
In step 3, since the symmetric session-key K is established between the two 
principals, A is now able to send a secret message {m1,...,mk}K to B using the session 
key K. 
There are also other ways of authentication without server such as authentication 
based on shared-secret and even more authentication without neither server nor 
shared secret. The protocol that we study in this thesis is an example of 
authentication based on shared-secret whereas the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol [11] is a common example of authentication without using shared-secret. 
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1.1.1 Attacker Modelling and Scenarios 
Only the correct message transfers of the protocol are described in the formalization 
of the protocol in the previous section, therefore it is important to be aware of the 
possibility of an attacker present on the network. A common way to model the ability 
of attackers to send and receive messages and to perform encryptions as well as 
decryptions on a public accessed network is to use the classical approach of Dolev 
and Yao [12], the notion of a “hardest attacker". This model allows the attacker to 
perform the following operations: 
 The attacker is able to intercept any message. 
 The attacker can decrypt an encrypted message if and only if he knows the 
key. The attacker can encrypt messages using keys in his possession. The 
attacker cannot guess a key. 
 The attacker can construct new messages. 
 The attacker can send constructed or intercepted messages on the network. 
Some basic scenarios are listed below: 
Deletion 
The attacker can delete a message before it reaches to the receiver. This kind of 
attacks would halt or restart the protocol since usually timers are used in 
implementations. 
Insertion  
The attacker can send a message that is totally created by himself. This could be an 
initiation message, a request or a response. 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is possible when the attacker can intercept and read messages of the 
protocol. As shown in Figure 1.1, eavesdropper does not send any messages to 
principals nor take any messages from them, so this is a passive attack. Encryption is 
used against eavesdropping since most attacks include eavesdropping to gain basic 
knowledge. 
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Figure 1.1: Eavesdropping 
 
Replay Attack 
After eavesdropping, the attacker could send the message that he gained to any 
principal in a new run of that protocol as shown in Figure 1.2. This type of attacks 
can be avoided by verifying freshness of the messages. Using nonces, timestamps or 
sequence numbers avoids replay attack. 
 
Figure 1.1: Replay Attack 
Modification 
This type of attacks needs interception to gain the message. Interception is different 
from eavesdropping since the recipient cannot receive the original message. The 
attacker modifies the original message and sends it to the recipient as in Figure 1.3. 
Encryption is not a complete solution to this problem because the message can be 
replaced with another (a previous one) message using the same key. To avoid 
modification, hashing can be used with digital signature. If a message is sent with its 
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hash signed with the private key of the sender, then an attacker will have to posses 
that private key to modify the message with a valid hash value. 
 
Figure 1.3: Modification 
Man-In-the-Middle 
In this type of attacks, the attacker works in a bidirectional manner. Namely, he uses 
eavesdropping and modification attacks to both of the principals in the protocol. As 
shown in Figure 1.4, the attacker is like the recipient and the sender of both sides. 
The solution of this attack is bilateral authentication which allows communicating 
principals to verify that received message comes from the genuine sender. 
 
Figure 1.4: Man-in-the-middle Attack 
Since an attacker is present the attacker can intercept and replay any messages in the 
global scenario, it is not possible to determine neither the sender nor the receiver of a 
message by looking at it. If the WMF protocol from the previous section is deployed 
on a network where an attacker is present, the following run of the protocol could 
occur in Table 1.2: 
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Table 1.2: Attack Scenario for WMF 
 
In this message transfer, M(S) denotes the malicious attacker acting as S. The first 
message sent from A to the server is intercepted by the attacker. But the attacker 
cannot decrypt the session key since he does not possess the key KA. Then the 
attacker changes the intercepted message by replacing B with his own identifier M 
and sends this message to the real server S. Receiving this message the server S 
believes that A wants to engage a secure communication with the attacker M. 
Therefore, S encrypts the session key K with the master key KM , which is shared 
between the attacker and the server, and sends it to the attacker. Inasmuch as the 
attacker got the session key, he is able to intercept and read messages sent from A to 
B encrypted under the session key K. A believes that the messages are to be secret 
between him and B, but in fact they are readable to the attacker. 
1.2 Protocol Validation 
In protocol validations, choosing the properties to be validated is an important issue. 
For instance, a protocol validated to be tolerant to denial of service attacks could 
very well be flawed with respect to replay attacks. The most common properties to 
consider when validating cryptographic protocols are: 
Authenticity Communication over a protocol that offers authenticity means that 
principals are communicating with the exact principals they believe to be 
communicating with. To be authenticated means to ensure that principals are actually 
who they say they are. 
Authentication properties have been discussed in many different levels of 
abstraction. The authentication property studied in [13] describes authentication at 
the level of the individual messages used in communication. The idea is to be sure 
that the messages always have the intended destination and origin, no matter how an 
attacker interferes with communication. 
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Confidentiality A protocol that ensures confidentiality prevents the disclosure of 
transmitted data to unauthorized parties, such that only the intended receiver is able 
to read the data.  
Integrity Messages cannot be changed by any malicious user when data integrity is 
offered. Modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of transmitted data is detected. 
In addition, there are some other properties like non-repudiation [14].  
Various approaches have been used in protocol validations. Formalizing protocols in 
some simplified programming language, process calculus or logic description and  
using automatic tools to verify the properties for the simplified description of the 
protocol is the tendency of the most recent research. The three main approaches in 
automatic verification are: 
 Theorem proving The correctness of systems is determined by properties in 
a mathematical theory with deductive methods. Then these properties are 
proved using automatic tools such as theorem provers and proof checkers. 
This method is used in [15] to verify the SET protocol and in [16] for the 
automatic train operating system METEOR of the (first) driverless metro-line 
in Paris. 
 State exploration A protocol is modelled as a finite-state system and then the 
verification is evaluated by exploring each state in the protocol and reporting 
if the protocol enters a state that violates the properties to be validated. A 
number of  model checkers and state exploration methods have been applied 
to the security protocols as well. Murphi is a well-known example of this 
group[6,7]. 
 Static analysis An indispensable technique for language-based security 
which has successfully detected errors in protocols [18,13]. Control flow 
analysis is used to do an over-approximation of the possible variable bindings 
and message transfers. Constructing reference monitor semantics it is 
possible to know whether the properties to be validated are violated. 
Theorem proving can deal with infinite state spaces and can verify the validity of 
properties for arbitrary parameter values and is a convenient method for protocols 
such as classical key distribution, where the reasoning about the formalization of the 
protocol into a logic description is relatively simple, and the assumption made prior 
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to a run of the protocol. The main disadvantages of theorem proving are the slowness 
of the verification process, and the error-prone and labor-intensive character of 
application. Furthermore, the mathematical logic requires a rather high degree of user 
expertise. Although some successful applications of theorem proving, like the 
thorough verification of smartcard software have been reported, the drawbacks have 
restricted their use mainly to the academic world [17] . 
Model checking and static analysis methods are similar in the sense of the usage of 
the reachability analysis. Confidentiality is interpreted by ensuring the secret data 
does not reach the attacker. Authentication is reachability in the sense that 
information should end up at the intended user from the intended provider of that 
information. These two methods have different advantages and disadvantages. Model 
checking approach returns a trace of the protocol that leads to the reported error, after 
investigating all possible traces trough the protocol. As the length of the protocol to 
be analyzed increases the number of different traces through a protocol raises 
significantly, and if an attacker is present, the number of states is infinite which 
makes it hard to use the method on full scale protocols. Murphi [6] is used as a 
prework of this thesis and this drawback is clearly seen, though it is out of the scope 
of this thesis. In static analysis, it is possible to create an over-approximation of the 
components, without investigating all possible traces, this makes it feasible to create 
automatic tools for validations with the presence of an attacker. If an error is reported 
by the static analysis, the trace leading to the error is however not part of the result. 
1.3 Strategy and Concepts 
In this thesis, the security properties of the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way 
Handshake protocol are analyzed. This task is done in several steps: 
1. Derivation of a model of the protocol and description of the protocol in the 
LySa process calculus. 
2. Static analysis of the LySa process which reveals potential breaches in the 
protocol. 
3. Analysis of the result of the static analysis.. 
LySa process calculus [18] is the framework that the analysis of the protocols are 
carried out. LySa is a process calculus in the pi[19]/spi[21] calculus family and 
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validates the authentication properties of communication protocols, specifically the 
destination/origin authentication properties.  
Static analysis [20] is the basis of our analysis. This means that we conservatively 
construct an approximation of the behavior of the protocol. In doing so we focus on: 
1. the communications that may take place over the network 
2. the potential bindings of the variables occurring in the protocol  
3. the potential violations of the destination/origin annotations of the protocol  
The Dolev-Yao attacker [12] is used in the analysis therefore any message sent on 
the network may be intercepted, any encryption with a key known to the attacker 
may be decrypted by him and furthermore the attacker may make use of all the 
information available to him to construct new encryptions and to send messages on 
the network. The notion of a perfect encryption library is used in order to be able to 
model encryption. Simply, an encrypted message can only be decrypted if the correct 
key is used. 
The protocol that is chosen to be analyzed in thesis is the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-
TEK 3-Way Handshake. Executed after the initial Authentication Stage or on 
Handover, the basic purpose of the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake 
is the distribution of keying parameters, such as the Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) 
which are also encrypted using Key Encryption Keys (KEK), related to all Security 
Associations (SA) active between a Mobile Station (MS) and the Base Station (BS). 
1.4 Structure of This Report 
Chapter 2 introduces the concepts and usage of the security protocols  in the IEEE 
802.16 standard that we analyze in this thesis. The intention in the thesis and the 
aimed contribution is also stated in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 presents the LySa calculus which is be used in the static analysis and the 
modelling of the protocol in LySa calculus.  
Chapter 4 presents static analysis, the technique used in the analysis of IEEE 802.16 
PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake protocol. Includes an example analysis for a 
simple protocol. 
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Chapter 5 includes the experiments and the analysis of the protocol. We modelled 
the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake (described in chapter 2) using 
the LySa calculus (described in chapter 3) and analyzed using static analysis 
(described in chapter 4). 
Chapter 6 summarizes our work and concludes on the security aspect of the 
analyzed protocol.  
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2. IEEE 802.16 SECURITY 
The IEEE 802.16 Working Group on Broadband Wireless Access Standards 
develops the IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN® Standard for Wireless Metropolitan Area 
Networks. This standard specifies the air interface of fixed broadband wireless 
access (BWA) systems. 
While the 802.16 family of standards is officially called WirelessMAN, it has been 
entitled Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) by an industry 
group called the WiMAX Forum, whose mission is to promote and certify 
compatibility and interoperability of broadband wireless products.  
The first 802.16 standard, which was designed to provide the last mile for Wireless 
Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN) with line-of-sight (LOS) working at 10-
66GHz bands, was approved in 2001 and was followed by two amendments: 802.16a 
and 802.16c to address issues of radio spectrum and inter-operability, respectively.  
In 2003, a revision project called 802.16REVd commenced aiming to align the 
standard with aspects of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) HIPERMAN standard as well as lay down conformance and test 
specifications. This project concluded in 2004 with the release of IEEE standard 
802.16-2004 which consolidates previous standards, also supports non-line-of-sight 
(NLOS) within 2-11GHz bands and mesh nodes [22]. In addition, the earlier 802.16 
documents including the a/b/c amendments are now superseded. 
An amendment and corrigendum to the standard that aims to provide mobility in 
BWA and presents new security protocols was concluded in 2005 and named as 
IEEE 802.16e-2005 [2].  
Two types of principals communicate in IEEE 802.16 and since IEEE 802.16e-2005 
comes up with mobility, the client principal which was called as the subscriber 
station (SS) in the previous versions is now called the mobile station (MS) and the 
other principal who acts as the server is still called the base station (BS).
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With the entry of the MS to the network, using the ranging protocol, the 
communication starts. The purpose of the ranging protocol is to set up the physical 
communication parameters and to assign a basic connection identifier to the 
requesting MS. Later, the ranging protocol is periodically executed to 
recommunicate the physical communication parameters [23]. 
After that, the registration protocol is performed in order to allow the mobile station 
into the network. BS and MS’ security capabilities are negotiated during the 
registration protocol. The stations may agree on authentication and key management 
protocols. Authentication options are: unilateral authentication, mutual authentication 
and no authentication. The mutual authentication was missing in the previous 
versions and it was one of the problems that were mentioned in the related papers 
such as [1] but now it is included in IEEE 802.16e-2005. Key management protocols 
are focused on this thesis and are described in details in the following sections.  
The key management protocols are periodically executed to update the traffic 
encryption keys (TEK) which can be thought as the session keys. After the 
establishment of the TEKs, user data protocols start. Traffic encryption keys are used 
as sequential pairs and have overlapping lifetimes to avoid service interruptions. 
The authentication and key management protocols are specified in the security 
sublayer of IEEE 802.16 standard. The security sublayer is meant to provide 
subscribers with privacy and authentication and operators with strong protection 
from theft of service. The security sublayer consists of two component protocols, an 
encapsulation protocol for securing packet data across the network and a key 
management protocol providing the secure distribution of keying data from the base 
station to the mobile station. In the following sections we will focus on the key 
management protocol. The Privacy and Key Management (PKM) protocol of IEEE 
802.16 and the second version of this protocol, which is announced with IEEE 
802.16e-2005 and aims to fix the bugs in the former protocol, are described in the 
following sections. 
2.1 Overview of PKMv1 (IEEE 802.16-2004)  
The first version of the Privacy and Key Management Protocol consists of two 
specific components, which are designed for IEEE 802.16 and defined in Security 
Sublayer. The first protocol is the PKM Authorization Protocol which is established 
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by the subscriber station (SS) and responded by the base station  (BS). As we 
mentioned before, in PKMv1 the standard was not mobile and we use the notation SS 
instead of MS (mobile station). At the end of a successful run of this protocol, an 
Authorization Key (AK) is created by SS and transmitted to SS. After that, each 
party generates a Key Encryption Key (KEK) using their AK. KEKs are used in 
distributing Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) which can be taken as session keys, 
while AK/KEK are long term keys. Then comes the second part: the Privacy and Key 
Management protocol which lets SS to gather TEKs from SS, which are encrypted 
by KEKs. The flow of the protocols in PKMv1 can be seen in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The PKMv1 Protocols 
 
2.1.1 PKM Authorization 
The PKM authorization protocol aims to distribute an authorization key (AK) to an 
authorized SS. The authorization protocol is a three-message exchange between an 
SS and a BS but it is not in a one by one manner since the first two messages are by 
the SS. When successful BS responds with the third message, which is actually the 
transmission of the AK from BS to SS. The messages can be seen in Table 2.1. 
Authorization Protocol (AK Generation) 
 
 
AK 
 
KEK (Derived from AK) 
Privacy & Key Management (TEK Generation) 
 
TEKs 
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Table 2.1: The PKM Authorization Protocol 
 
 
SS uses Message 1, formally named as the Authentication Information Message,  to 
push its X.509 certificate which identifies its manufacturer to BS. BS uses this 
certificate to decide whether SS is a trusted device. BS may ignore this message in 
order to allow access only to devices from recognized manufacturers, according to its 
security policy. 
SS sends Message 2, named as the Authorization Request immediately after Message 
1. Message 2 consists of SS’s X.509 certificate with the SS public key, its security 
capabilities which are actually the authentication and encryption algorithms that SS 
support, and the security association identity (SAID) which is the id of the secure 
link between SS and BS. Using the certificate BS determines whether to authorize 
SS, and the public key of SS which is also in the certificate lets BS construct 
Message 3. 
If successful, namely SS is authorized after BS verifies its certificate, BS responds 
with Message 3 the Authorization Reply. This message includes the AK encrypted 
using the RSA public-key encryption protocol using the public-key of SS which was 
obtained in the previous message, the lifetime of the AK as a 32-bit unsigned number 
in unit of seconds, the sequence number for AK as a 4-bit value and the list of SA 
descriptors each including an SAID and the SA cipher suit. The successful run of the 
protocol instantiates an authorization SA between the two stations. The design 
assumes that only BS and SS possess the AK, that means that the key is confidential 
and never revealed to any other party. 
Message 1: Authentication Information Message 
 
SS → BS: Certificate(Manufacturer(SS)) 
 
Message 2: Authorization Request 
 
SS → BS: Certificate(SS) | Capabilities | SAID 
 
Message 3: Authorization Reply 
 
BS → SS: RSA-Encrypt(PubKey(SS), AK) | Lifetime | SeqNo | SAIDList 
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2.1.2 Privacy and Key Management 
The privacy and key management protocol aims to establish a data SA between BS 
and SS. The first message of the protocol is optional and used for forcing rekeying, 
therefore the protocol is a two or three message exchange between SS and BS. When 
successful, the BS sends TEKs to SS in the last message of the protocol. The 
messages in the protocol can be seen in the Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: The Privacy and Key Management Protocol 
 
 
If BS wants to rekey a data SA or create a new SA, it starts the protocol with the first 
message which contains the sequence number of the AK used for the exchange, the 
id of the data SA being created or rekeyed and HMAC-SHA1 digest of these two 
fields. Computation of  HMAC(1) requires a HMAC key which is derived from the 
AK, therefore it allows SS to detect forgeries. 
The second message, named as the Key Request, is where SS requests the SA 
parameters. If the protocol was started by BS, SS takes SAID from message 1 with 
valid HMAC(1). Otherwise, SS takes SAID from the authorization protocol 
SAIDList. Then HMAC is computed with the sequence number of AK and the 
SAID. 
The third message, the Key Reply, is sent if the HMAC and the SAID in message 2 
is valid. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, TEKs have overlapping 
lifetimes to avoid service interruptions. The OldTEK value has the active SA 
parameters whereas the NewTEK value has the SA parameters to be used on the 
expiry of the current TEK. OldTEK includes the initialization vector, remaining 
lifetime and sequence number for the specified data SA for the previous generation 
TEK, and similarly NewTEK includes the same parameters for the next TEK. The 
 [Message 1: BS → SS: SeqNo | SAID | HMAC(1)] 
 
Message 2: Key Request 
 
SS → BS: SeqNo | SAID | HMAC(2) 
 
Message 3: Key Reply 
 
BS → SS: SeqNo | SAID | OldTEK | NewTEK | HMAC(3) 
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TEKs are encrypted with 3-DES using the Key Encryption Key (KEK) which is 
derived from the AK. This message also has HMAC to avoid forgeries. 
2.2 Overview of PKMv2 (IEEE 802.16e-2005)  
The second version of  the Privacy and Key Management (PKM) protocol of IEEE 
802.16 is described in IEEE 802.16e-2005 and aims to fix the bugs in the former 
version. 
The AK derivation is now established by the well known standards RSA and EAP. In 
PKMv2, RSA and EAP can be used in different ways which are defined in the 
standard [2],  such as RSA, RSA+EAP, EAP and EAPinEAP. Therefore the AK 
derivation is now much more specific and with the contribution of two principals 
much more secure. In addition BS now has a certificate, and can authenticate itself to 
the MS by mutual authentication. Nonces are used against replay attacks. The 
process can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: The PKMv2 Protocols 
 
 
The important part of PKMv2 is the SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake. It is based on the 
second part of the former protocol, but now it has more security features. The 
original specification has three messages with H-MACs and in total twenty-one 
fields. The main fields are described in Table 2.3. 
AK (also KEKs and H-C/MAC keys are derived from AK) 
AK Generation is established using  
either EAP or RSA or both  
 
PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake 
 
TEKs 
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Table 2.3: The PKMv2 Protocols 
Attribute Content 
MS_Random Number received from MS 
BS_Random Number included in SA-TEK-Challenge or SA-Challenge 
KeySeqNo AK Seq. No 
AKID Id of the AK that was used for protecting this message 
SA-TEK-Update TEKs encrypted by KEKs 
Frame No The frame number that old PMKs and associated AKs 
should be discarded 
SA_Descriptors Only for initial entry 
SecNegParam. Confirms messages security capabilities 
HMAC/CMAC Message Authentication Codes 
 
The PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way handshake sequence proceeds as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: The PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way handshake 
BS_Random, KeySeqNo, AKID, [KeyLifeTime], H-C/MAC 
MS_Random,BS_Random, KeySeqNo, AKID, 
SecurityCapabilities,SecNegParam,PKMConfSettings, H-C/MAC 
MS_Random,BS_Random, KeySeqNo, AKID, [SA-TEKUpdate], 
FrameNo, [SADescriptors], SecNegParam, H-C/MAC 
 
 
M
S 
 
 
B 
S 
1. SA-TEK-Challenge 
2. SA-TEK-Request 
3. SA-TEK-Response 
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The first message, named as PKMv2 SA-TEK-Challenge, includes a random number 
generated by BS and similar to the previous version protected by HMAC/CMAC 
tuple. 
The second message is the PKMv2 SA-TEK-Request and includes the random 
number generated by MS, the random number of BS received in the first message, 
and the similar fields as in the previous version of the protocol, just as described in 
the previous section. 
The BS checks the AKID, HMAC/CMAC and the BS_Random of the message 2 and 
if any of these values are invalid, than ignores the message. Otherwise, it checks the 
security capabilities provided by the MS and if the properties does not match it 
reports this inconsistency to the higher layers. 
If the second message is successfully validated by the BS then message 3 which is 
named as the PKMv2 SATEK-Response is sent to MS. This message has the SA-
TEKUpdate unless for the handover and the security capabilities that BS wishes to 
specify for the session with the MS. 
If the last message is successfully verified by MS using the HMAC/CMAC, the 
received TEKs and associated parameters will be installed by the MS. The security 
negotiation parameters of BS should also be verified by MS but the failure of this 
verification may not cause halt of the protocol since MS may continue by adopting 
the security negotiation parameters encoded in SA-TEK Response message. 
2.3 Overview of Contribution 
The PKMv1 was defined in IEEE 802.16-2004 and it had many problems and flaws 
in it which are mainly discussed in [1]. For example, the data SA (Security 
Association) was explicitly defined but the Authorization SA was not. The SS had an 
X.509 certificate, but BS did not. BS did not even authenticate itself to the SS. Even 
the IV (initial vector) in the encryption phase was predictable. Therefore, IEEE 
802.16 PKMv1 did not provide any data authenticity. Besides, the rogue AP problem 
in 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks [24] was still existing in the sense that there 
was no BS identity in Authorization SA. Furthermore, the TEK identifiers were only 
2-bits in length, DES-CBC was not a convenient way of encryption, the AK 
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derivation was only BS’s job and SS did not have chance to participate it, and 
because security features were used against replay attacks.  
PKMv2 left the first part of PKMv1, namely the AK derivation to the well known 
standards RSA and EAP. In fact, RSA already existed in the PKMv1 but in PKMv2 
RSA and EAP can be used in different ways which are defined in the standard such 
as RSA, RSA+EAP, EAP and EAPinEAP. Therefore the AK derivation is now much 
more specific and with the contribution of two participation much more secure. In 
addition BS now has a certificate, and can authenticate itself to the MS by mutual 
authentication. Nonces are used against replay attacks. 
PKMv1 had many missing parts in it, but PKMv2 is over-strengthened. This does not 
mean that PKMv2 can be considered as the ultimate secure protocol, but it definitely 
has degraded efficiency since it needs more sources and time for the security features 
it has.  The aim of this thesis is to argue that, PKMv2 can still pursue its security 
with less features than it has. In other words, PKMv1 was a failure in wireless 
security, just like the WEP in IEEE 802.11 [31], so PKMv2 is now overloaded, but a 
light version of PKMv2 should serve as good as now it is.  
Our approach is to see the limits of robustness in IEEE 802.16 PKMv2. The way we 
do it is removing the extras and the improvements in PKMv2 one by one, and in 
different combinations. We want to see when the robustness will be lost, what 
preserves the robustness and how is this accomplished. We also want to see if some 
improvements are unnecessary then what are they, and can we provide better 
efficiency with less strength? The result may lead us to a simplified by still strong 
and secure protocol. 
The experiments could be established by constructing the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way 
Handshake beginning from the simple PKMv1. In order to see where the problems 
arise and where the flaws start, the experiments are held in the reverse direction, 
namely from the full protocol to a simpler but still secure revised protocol. 
2.4 Specifying IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
Obviously, the description of IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
contains many details that won’t be used in modelling. Not all the fields make the 
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protocol secure, so there should be a simplification such as removing the fields 
which have no effect on security itself. 
John Mitchell [25]  simplified the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake 
to make a formal verification with Murphi as shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Mitchell’s Simplified version of the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way HS 
 
 
Rewriting the simplified PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake in a more familiar 
protocol narration style is shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: The Simplified PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way Handshake 
 
 
Using the abbreviations below we can have a shorter narration: 
BS = A, MS = B, NBS = NA , NMS = NB, MSSuite = S, SAUpdate = T, AK = K, 
AKID = Id 
The simplified and abbreviated version of PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake is 
shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: Simplified and Abbreviated Version of  PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-way HS 
 
 
1. BS  MS :  BSNonce, AKID, MIC[AK](BSNonce, AKID) 
 
2. MS BS :  BSNonce, MSNonce, AKID, MSSuite, 
MIC[AK](MSNonce, BSNonce, AKID, MSSuite) 
 
3. BS  MS :  SAUpdate, BSNonce, MSNonce, AKID, 
MIC[AK](SAUpdate, MSNonce, BSNonce, AKID) 
1. BS  MS: NBS, AKID, MIC{ NBS, AKID}AK 
 
2. MS BS : NBS, NMS, AKID, MSSuite, MIC{ NBS, NMS, AKID, MSSuite}AK 
 
3. BS  MS: SAUpdate, NBS, NMS, AKID, MIC{ SAUpdate, NBS, NMS, 
AKID}AK 
1. A  B: NA, ID, MIC{ NA, Id}K 
 
2. B  A: NA, NB, Id, S, MIC{ NA, NB, Id, S}K 
 
3. A  B: T, NA, NB, Id, MIC{ T, NA, NB, Id}K 
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In order to use this handshake specification in LySa, some parameters should be 
reordered and for simplicity some of them need to be reabbreviated. This reordering 
does not affect the security features but it is needed for LySa which will be explained 
in the following chapter.  
The reordered, simplified and reabbreviated PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
protocol narration is shown in Table 2.7, named as Pkmv2-simple.protocol. 
Table 2.7: Pkmv2-simple.protocol 
 
2.5 Considerations in Modelling 
In our specification of the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake in 
section 2.5, we have six different fields. First of all, every message has a nonce 
which are freshly generated values: na, nb. Then comes the authorization key (AK) 
which is a shared-secret long term key: K. This key also has an id which is used in 
every message: id. The second message, which is actually called the SA-TEK-
Request, includes a field that provides information about the security capabilities of 
the MS: S. Last message, which is actually called the SA-TEK-Response, includes the 
session keys (TEKs) which are encrypted by special keys that are generated from AK 
(KEK: Key Encryption Key): T. Finally, all the messages have message 
authentication codes which are generated from the whole message and using AK: 
MAC.  
In the modelling phase of this entities, three major studies are taken as guidelines. 
Nonces are modelled as they are modelled by Buchholtz’s implementation of The 
Bauer, Berson, and Feiertag (BBF) protocol which aims at establishing a fresh shared 
key, between two principals using nonces [26]. 
The long term key and the id of it are modelled as they are modelled in the 
impressive study about static validation which is also the basis for this thesis [13]. 
Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [21] (WMF) which aims at establishing a secret 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
 
3. A  B: na, nb, id, T, MAC{ na, nb, id, T}K 
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(symmetric) session key between two principals who share master keys with a 
trusted server, has an implementation in this study which includes the long term key 
usage that can be used for K in our specification of the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-
TEK 3-Way Handshake and also the id of K. 
The encrypted session key can be taken as an ordinary message field, like in 
Mitchell’s work [25]. In addition, the security capabilities field is no doubt an 
ordinary field for us, therefore these two fields S and T will be modelled as they are 
in modelled in WMF. 
The modelling of the message authentication codes is a difficult problem but in [27] 
comes a clever solution for the problem which is described in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.1. 
The summary of the considerations in modelling and the basis implementations are 
given in the Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8: Modelling Summary 
Field Definition Implementation 
Nonces Fresh generated BBF 
K Long term key WMF 
Id Long term key id WMF 
T Encrypted session key WMF (as a message) 
S Security Capabilities WMF (as a message) 
MACs Message Authentication Codes TLS 
 
 
 24 
3. LYSA 
This chapter is about LySa [13], a process calculus based on the π-calculus [28] and 
incorporates cryptographic operations using ideas from the Spi-calculus [21]. 
Though, there are two main differences. First difference is that, LySa does not have 
channels but one global. That is because in usual implementations like ethernet-
based or wireless, anyone can eavesdrop or act as an active attacker and that’s 
definitely not the channel based communication.  The second difference is about the 
usage of pattern matching in the expression of the tests associated with input and 
decryption. 
3.1 LySa Calculus 
To analyze the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake protocol we need 
to formalize it in LySa calculus. The distinguishing features of LySa can be 
summarized as: LySa has only one global communication channel or network. 
Everyone in the network can see the messages between processes. The LySa calculus 
has primitives for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Besides, decryption is 
modelled using pattern matching.  
3.1.1 Syntax 
LySa consists of terms and processes; terms consist of names (keys, nonces, 
messages, etc.), variables, public/private keys and the compositions of them using 
symmetric/asymmetric encryptions. The syntax of terms E is shown in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1: LySa Terms 
 
 E ::= terms     
  n    name ( n  N  ) 
  x    variable ( x  X ) 
  k
+
, k

    public and private keys 
  { E1,...,Ek 

0
}E [dest L]  symmetric encryption ( k  0 ) 
  {| E1,...,Ek |

0
}E [dest L] asymmetric encryption ( k  0 ) 
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In Table 3.1, N denotes the sets of names and X denotes the sets of variables. Tuples 
of terms E1,...,Ek are encrypted under a term E0 representing a key in the cases of 
symmetric or asymmetric encryption. An assumption of perfect cryptography is 
adopted, meaning that the only inverse function of encryption is to use decryptions 
with the correct key. 
The syntax of processes P which is mostly familiar to the polyadic Spi-calculus [21] 
is shown in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: Processes 
 
 
The input operation with pattern matching will only succeed if the prefix of the 
message matches the terms specified before semi-colon in the input operation. The 
input process (E1,...,Ej ; xj+1,...,xk).P means that a k-tuple of values (
'
1E ,...,
'
kE ) is 
taken as the input and if the first 1≤ i ≤ j values 'iE   are pairwise matched to the 
values Ei, the remaining k-j values of the input will be binded to the variables 
xj+1,...,xk. In other words, the values before the semi-colon are to matched to the 
beginning part of the input and if the matching is successful the remaining part of the 
input will be assigned to variables after the semi-colon. This pattern matching is also 
used in decryptions as shown in Table 3.2. If no matching will be performed, then 
nothing is written before the semi-colon. Similarly, if  no binding will be performed, 
then nothing is written after the semi-colon. For example,  
P = decrypt {y}K as {x;}K in P’ 
means that the decryption in P succeeds only if x = y whereas  
P ::= processes    
 0    nil 
 E1,...,Ek.P   output 
 (E1,...,Ej ; xj+1,...,xk).P  input (with matching) 
 P1 | P2    parallel composition 
 ( n)P    restriction 
 !P    replication 
 decrypt E as {E1,...,Ej ; xj+1,...,xk

0
}E [orig L] in P 
symmetric decryption (with matching) 
 decrypt E as {|E1,...,Ej ; xj+1,...,xk|

0
}E [orig L] in P 
asymmetric decryption ( k  0 ) 
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Q = decrypt {y}K as {;x}K in Q’ 
means that  the decryption in Q always succeeds, binding x to y.  
LySa syntax also have annotations for origin and destination in order to describe the 
intentions of the protocols. Encryptions can be annotated with fixed labels, called 
crypto-points defining it’s position in the process, and with assertions specifying the 
origin and destination of encrypted messages. Crypto-points   are from some 
enumerable set C (disjoint from N and X) and added to state where the encryptions 
and decryptions occur. The LySa term for encryption: 
{ E1,...,Ek 

0
}E [dest L] 
means that the encryption is created at crypto-points   and specifies the intended 
crypto-points LC for decryption of the encrypted value in the assertion [dest L] 
Similarly, in the LySa term for decryption: 
decrypt E as {E1,...,Ej ; xj+1,...,xk

0
}E [orig L] in P 
[orig L] specifies the crypto-points LC that E is allowed to have been encrypted. 
For the terms with all annotations removed 
.
 is used, and in particular: 
{ E1,...,Ek 

0
}E [dest L]  = { 
E1  ,..., Ek  
 

0
} E [dest L] 
In addition, for each name n there is a canonical representative  n  and similarly, the 
function 
.
 is extended homomorphically to terms:  E  is the term where all names 
and variables are replaced by their canonical versions.  
3.1.2 Semantics 
This section gives a short description of the reduction semantics defined for LySa 
following the tradition of the π -calculus. We use the notation of P[E/x] to describe 
that all occurrences of x in process P should be replaced by the term E, in other 
words the value of E is bound to variable x in P. In addition, names used in a LySa 
process are global, for instance if a name “X" occurs in two places in the process 
they have the same meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to use local variables and 
each name should only be used in one meaning.  
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As described in the previous section, all occurrences of a bound name n is mapped to 
one canonical name  n  and the same mapping applies for variables. The function 
applied to terms  E  replaces all names and variables in the term with their 
canonical versions. We say that two processes are α -equivalent only if the mapping 
of names and variables correspond. 
Structural congruence, ≡, is defined on processes to be the least congruence 
satisfying the following conditions: 
 P ≡ Q if P and Q are disciplined α-equivalent; 
 (P / ≡, |, 0) is a commutative monoid: 
o P | Q ≡ Q | P 
o P | ( Q | R ) ≡ (P | Q) | R 
o P | 0 ≡ P 
 ( n)0 ≡ 0, 
( n) ( n’)P ≡ ( n’) ( n)P, and 
( n) (P|Q) ≡ P|( n)Q if n  fn(P); 
 !P ≡ P | !P 
We consider two variants of reduction relation R: the reference monitor semantics 
(RM) takes advantage of annotations, whereas the standard semantics () discards 
them. After the reduction semantics we will describe the reference monitor semantics 
in details.  
The rules for the reduction semantics R are shown in Table 3.3 and described 
below: 
Communication 
The rule Communication expresses that an output E1,...,Ek.P is matched by an input 
(
'
1E ,...,
'
jE ;xj+1,...,xk).Q if the first j elements are pairwise the same, namely Ei with all 
annotations removed is compared with 'iE  with all its annotations removed. If these 
comparisons are successful, rest of the terms each Ej+1 ,..., Ek  is bound to the 
variables  xj+1,...,xk. 
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Decryption / Asymmetric Decryption 
The rule Decryption expresses matching the term { E1,...,Ek 

0
}E [dest L], which is a 
result of an encryption, against the pattern in decrypt E as {E1,...,Ej ; 
xj+1,...,xk

0
}E [orig L] in P if the key used for decryption corresponds to the one used 
to create the encrypted term. This is accomplished by adding the condition 
 in addition to the case for communication which required the first j 
components to be pairwise the same. This models perfect symmetric cryptography. If 
the matching is successful rest of the terms are binded to the variables as in the 
previous rule. In the case of asymmetric decryption, the decryption key should be the 
opposite of the encryption key, namely {E0, 
'
0E }={m
+
,m

} ∨ {E0, 
'
0E }={m

,m
+
} 
which is shortly expressed by {E0, 
'
0E }={m
±,m∓} 
In the reference monitor semantics we ensure that the crypto-point of the encrypted 
value is acceptable at the decryption (i.e.  L’)  and the crypto-point of the 
decryption is acceptable for the encryption (i.e.  ’ L). But in the standard 
semantics the condition R(  ,L’,  ’, L) is universally true and therefore can  be 
ignored.  
Parallel 
The rule for parallel construction is standard; using the reduction semantics, two 
parallel processes P | Q are reduced on either one of them. 
Restriction / Asymmetric Restriction 
The rule for restriction ( n)P applies the reduction semantics on the restricted 
processes. In the case of asymmetric restriction, the same rule applies on asymmetric 
keys. 
Congruence 
The rule for congruence expresses that, if the reduction semantics are applied two 
congruent processes P ≡ Q are reduced to two congruent processes P’ ≡ Q’ 
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Table 3.3: Operational semantics 
 
Reference Monitor Semantics 
In reference monitor semantics, the reduction rules of the semantics are the same but 
instead of defining the R relation, the reference monitor takes this relation as input: 
RM(  ,L’,  ’, L) = (  L’ ∧  ’ L) which means that the encryption made at 
 must be in the set L’ of expected origins of  the data, as well as the actual place 
where decryption takes place  ’ must be in the set of expected destinations L. In 
other words, decryptions may only occur at crypto-points specified in the 
corresponding encryption and vice-versa, otherwise the execution is halted. 
3.2 Modelling Protocols in LySa 
The translation from ordinary protocol narration into a LYSA process is done in two 
stages:  
1. The ordinary protocol narration is refined into an extended protocol narration. 
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2. The extended protocol narration is translated into LySa.  
A discussion on the need for extending the ordinary protocol narration can be found 
in [29]. 
3.2.1 Extended Protocol Narrations 
As shown in Section 1.1, the protocol narrations list the messages to be exchanged. 
Here is the first message of the WMF protocol which was also used in Section 1.1: 
A  S : A,B,{K} KA
 
This line means that, the message containing A, B and K encrypted with the key KA is 
sent from A to S. 
To formalize the protocols to be analyzed, we have to use an extended version of this 
notation. The extended protocol narration distinguishes between inputs and 
corresponding outputs and also makes clear which checks must be performed [13]. 
The protocol narrations only list the messages to be exchanged, therefore the actions 
to be performed upon receiving the messages are left unspecified. 
The first step of unfolding the protocol narrations to the extended protocol narrations 
is to distinguish between outputs and the corresponding inputs. This is done also for 
encryptions and corresponding decryptions. In addition, the check on the received 
values and the freshness of the keys should be explicitly stated. In addition, the 
source and destination addresses may be added to the messages. Using this extension 
the first step of the WMF protocol would now be split into three parts: 
 
First line consists of the message sent from A with the source and destination 
addresses added as a prefix. Second line has the variables that are bound to the 
received messages fields. In the end of the second line exists the checks in the 
brackets. First check is to make sure that the message is really sent for S and the 
second check is to make sure that the sender of the message is the one in the first part 
(in extended narration third part) of the message (the one that wishes to 
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communicate). Third line shows the decryption of the encrypted value using the key 
KA and as a result xKey is bound to K.  
The last step is about the security goals namely the authenticity properties to be 
verified. The protocol narration is refined by specifying the origin and destination of 
encrypted messages. This will help us  to be sure of the confidential data is sent and 
received by the principals intended by the protocols. So the final result for the 
extended protocol narration of the WMF protocol is given below: 
 
The annotations in brackets including the tags dest and orig means that, the 
encrypted message sent in line 1 should only be decrypted at the principal S and the 
decrypted (part of the) message in line 1” should have been encrypted at principal A 
The protocol narration of the WMF protocol was given in Table 1.1 in chapter 1 and 
the extended narration of this protocol is given in Table 3.4 below: 
Table 3.4: The Extended protocol narration of the WMF protocol 
 
 
First three lines of this extended narration was explained and the remaining part is 
similarly derived from the narration. The important point is that,  the received 
variables are sent in line 2, in convenience with the original protocol. Also in lines 3’ 
and 3” some received variable are used again. 
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3.2.2 Modelling of Message Authentication Codes   
The message authentication codes which include the hash functions are the important 
parts of the model which need special modelling considerations. The method used in 
[27] is suitable for our analysis so we employed the usage as follows 
Hash functions  
Since the hash functions are one way functions they can be modelled with public-key 
encryption where we have different keys for encryption and decryption. If we can 
manage the encrypted value can never be decrypted we can use this as a hash 
function model. This is can be done by modelling the hash function using a public 
name and with no corresponding key for decryption. 
Message Authentication Codes  
In PKMv2 a keyed MAC is used to verify the integrity of messages. [27] also uses 
keyed MACs and they modelled it using a shared secret key and a cryptographic 
hash function. The message is hashed along with the key and then encrypted with the 
MAC key. Therefore, the message is encrypted by asymmetric encryption first. After 
that symmetric encryption is applied.  
3.2.3 LySa Model of IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
We are now ready to model protocols in LYSA; in particular we will model the IEEE 
802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake protocol.  
We had simplified the protocol and obtained the following narration in section 2.5: 
A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
A  B: na, nb, id, T, MAC{ na, nb, id, T}K 
The extended protocol narration for IEEE 802.6 SA-TEK 3W HS is listed in Table 
3.5 where we use the LYSA terms and syntax for writing the cryptographic 
operations. 
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Table 3.5: PKMv2 Extended Protocol Narration 
 
3.2.3 LySa Specification of IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
The extended narration can be translated into LYSA by dividing the narration into 
two processes, one for each principal. The LYSA specification of the protocol is 
given in table. Notice that the checks in the extended narration are represented by the 
pattern matchings on input and decryption.  
In the LYSA specification we add annotations to all cryptographic operations as 
described earlier in Chapter 3. The LySa model of the PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way 
Handshake is given in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6: PKMv2 LySa Model 
 
 
(υ K ) (υ  id) ( 
 ! (υ  na) <id, na, {{| id, na |}Hash}K [ at a1 dest {b1}]>. 
 (na, id; xnb, xS, xmac). 
 decrypt xmac as { {| na, id, xnb, xS |}Hash;} K [ at a2 orig {b2}] in 
 (υ  T) <na, nb, id, T, {{| na, nb, id, T |}Hash}K [ at a3 dest {b3}]>.0 
 | 
 !(id; yna, ymac) 
 decrypt ymac as {{| id, yna |}Hash;}K [ at b1 orig {a1}] in 
 (υ  nb) (υ  S) < yna, id, nb, S, { {| yna, id, nb, S |}Hash}K [ at b2 dest {a2}] > 
 (na, nb, id; yT, ymac). 
 decrypt ymac as { {| na, nb, id, yT |}Hash;}K [ at b3 orig {a3}] in 0 
) 
 
 
0. [new K][new id] 
1.   A     : id, na, {{| id, na |}Hash}K [dest B] [new na] 
1’.      B:  yid, yna, ymac [check yid = id] 
1’’.         B: decrypt ymac as {yh}K [orig A] [check yh = {| yid, yna |}Hash ] 
 
2.   B    : yna, id, nb, S, {{| yna, id, nb, S |}Hash}K [dest A] [new B] [new S] 
2’.      A: xna, xid, xnb, xS, xmac [check xna = na, xid = id] 
2’’.        A: decrypt xmac as {xh}K [orig B] [xh = {| na, id, xnb, xS |}Hash ] 
 
3.   A     : na, nb, id, T, {{| na, nb, id, T |}Hash}K [dest B] [new T] 
3’.      B:  yna, ynb, yid, yT, ymac [check yna = na, ynb = nb, yid = id] 
3’’.         B: decrypt ymac as {yh}K [orig A] [check yh = {| na, nb, id, yT |}Hash ] 
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4. STATIC ANALYSIS 
Static Analysis is a formal method that enables the security analysis of LySa 
processes. The analysis is based on tracking messages communicated on the network 
along with the possible values of the variables in the protocol and recording the 
potential violations of the destination/origin annotations.  
A LySa process describes a set of possible operations, the analysis uses an over-
approximation of this set, therefore the analysis could investigate a trace not possible 
at all. But this is needed to do a safe approximation because under-approximation 
could miss some traces. The over-approximation of a LySa-process is shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The over-approximation of a LySa-process 
 
The approximation of a term E is represented by a pair (,  ) and called estimate for 
E. Similarly, the approximation of a process P is represented by a triple (,  , ) 
and called estimate for P.  
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4.1 Terms 
The estimate for terms satisfies the judgements defined by the axioms and rules of 
Table 4.1. The analysis of terms uses a global abstract environment in order to keep 
track of the potential values of variables so that the analysis will determine a superset 
of the possible canonical values that each tem E may evaluate to. 
 
The abstract environment  maps the canonical variables to the set of canonical 
values that may be bound to. In the formula, V is written for the set of canonical 
terms with no free variables. The analysis of terms uses the abstract environment to 
make a judgement of the form: 
 
This shows that   ⊆ V is a safe approximation of the set of values that E may 
evaluate to in the abstract environment. 
Table 4.1: Analysis of terms,  E :  . 
 
 
The rules in Table 4.1. defines that   contains all the canonical values associated 
with the components of a term. The first, third and fourth rules in the first line are for 
names, private and public keys, respectively. These rules say that the canonical 
names must be in . The second  rule in the first line of the table is the rule for 
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variables and it expresses that the set of canonical value the canonical variable maps 
to from the environment must be a subset of  : ( x   ) ⊆  . 
The second line is the rule for k-ary symmetric encryption and the third line is the 
rule for k-ary asymmetric encryption. These rules express that each term is analyzed 
and all combinations of values from this analysis must be in   belonging to the 
analysis of the overall encryption term  { V1,...,Vk 
0
}V
 [dest L]  . V   notation 
tests if V is in the set  . 
4.2 Processes 
In the analysis of processes we focus on which values can flow on the network. The 
abstract network environment that includes all the message sequences that may flow 
on the network is shown as: 
 
The estimate for processes satisfies the judgements defined by the axioms and rules 
of Table 4.2. The judgements for processes takes the form: 
 
 
Here the symbol  represents the set of error messages of the form (  ,  ’) which 
indicates that something encrypted at   was unexpectedly decrypted at  ’. In the 
end of the section 3.1 we defined the reference monitor and here the analysis uses the 
reference monitor. If the reference monitor aborts, the annotation leading to the 
abortion should be placed in the error component  and the execution should 
continue. Namely,  contains an over-approximation of the potential 
origin/destination annotations.  
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Table 4.2: Analysis of processes, (,  ) RM P : . 
 
 
Table 4.2. defines the axioms and the rules for the analysis of the processes and    
gives the set of values that the terms can evaluate to. 
The first line of the Table 4.2 includes the rules for inactive processes and restriction 
(the last one is for public/private keys). The second line includes the rules for parallel 
composition and replication. The rule for the inactive processes does not restrict the 
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analysis result while the rules for parallel composition, restriction and replication 
ensure that the analysis also holds for the immediate subprocesses. 
The rule k-ary output which is for sending message on the network finds the sets  i 
for each term Ei and requires that all k-tuples of values V1,...,Vk taken from  1  . . 
.   k can flow on the network and also requires that (,  , ) are also valid 
analysis estimates of process P. 
The rule input checks whether the first j terms of  E1,...,Ek have acceptable estimates 
 i and  whether the first j values of any message V1,...,Vj ,Vj+1 ,...,Vk in  are 
pointwise included in  i. When the check is successful, the remaining values  Vj+1 
,...,Vk are included in the estimates for the corresponding variables xj+1 ,...,xk. 
The rules for decryption have a similar pattern matching with the previous rule. All 
the terms are evaluated to their respectable estimates i and the first j values of the 
evaluation of the encrypted term { V1,...,Vk 
0
}V

[dest L]   are checked whether they 
are pointwise included in  i. The rule for symmetric decryption ensures that only 
the correct key can be used to decrypt encrypted values. The rule for asymmetric 
decryption ensures that the key used for decryption must be the opposite of the one 
used for encryption. Similar to the input rule, if the matching succeeds for the first j 
values and in addition the keys for decryption matches the ones used for decryption, 
then the remaining values Vj+1 ,...,Vk are added to the acceptable estimates for the 
corresponding variables xj+1 ,...,xk. If the encrypted term E is decrypted at an 
unexpected place (  ’ L ) or the decrypted values are encrypted at an unexpected 
place (  L’), then the error component must contain the annotations where the 
error occurred (  ,  ’)  . 
If (,  ) RM P :  , then (,  , ) is a valid estimate for all the states passed 
through in an execution of  P. Also, when  =∅ in an estimate of the form (,  ) 
RM P :  then the reference monitor cannot abort the execution of P. These are all 
proved in [18]. 
4.3 Modelling The Attacker 
In practice, the protocols – especially the ones in wireless networks – are executed in 
medium with malicious attackers. As mentioned in subsection 1.1.1 LySa processes 
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will be analyzed in parallel with Dolev-Yao attacker[12] which can perform 
operations like sending/receiving messages and encryption/decryption same as a 
legitimate principal. The analysis result of a process P analyzed in parallel with the 
attacker contain the least solution that satisfy the rules from the previous Section for 
the estimate (,  , ) and the variable bindings for the attacker in addition to the 
variable bindings for the process P. 
We have new canonical name and variables for the attacker: all the canonical names 
of the attacker are mapped to n● and all the canonical variables of the attacker are 
mapped to z●. We also have  ● which is a crypto-point in the attacker, and we have 
the set C which is the set of crypto-points in the original process P in parallel with 
the attacker. Finally, there exists a public/private key-pair belonging to the attacker 
{m , m

 }.The formal definition of the Dolev-Yao attacker is given in Table 4.3. 
A process P is of type (N f , A  , A +Enc ) if (1) it is a closed process (it has no free 
variables, namely no variables that are never bound to a name), (2) its free names are 
in N f, (3) all the arguments used for sending and receiving are in A  and (4) all 
the arguments used for encryption and decryption are in A +
Enc
. 
Table 4.3: Dolev-Yao condition.. 
 
The descriptions of the conditions given in Table 4.3 are below: 
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1. The attacker can improve his knowledge by eavesdropping all messages sent 
on the network. 
2. The attacker can improve his knowledge by decrypting messages with the 
keys he already knows. Unless the intended recipient of the message was 
attacker, an error (  ,  ●) should be added to the error component  which 
means that something encrypted at   was actually decrypted by the attacker 
at  ●. 
3. The attacker can construct new encryptions using the keys he already knows. 
If this message is received and decrypted by a principal, then an error (  ●,  ) 
should be added to the error component  which means that something 
encrypted at the attacker was decrypted by the attacker by a process P at   
4. The attacker can send messages on the network using his knowledge and thus 
forge new  communications. 
5. The attacker initially has the knowledge of the canonical name n● and all free 
names of the process P. 
6. In addition to condition 2, if the attacker possesses the corresponding 
decryption key used for encryption, he can decrypt a term encrypted with 
asymmetric encryption. 
7. In addition to condition 3, the attacker can create an encrypted term using 
asymmetric encryption. 
8. The attacker has his own private/public key pair. 
This conditions enable the attacker to establish the attack scenarios that were defined 
in subsection 1.1.1. The soundness of Dolev-Yao condition is proved in [13] 
4.4 Analysis 
The flow of the analysis starts with a LySa code which contains the LySa model of 
the protocol. The LySa-tool parses the LySa code and transform into the Alternation-
free Least Fixed Point (ALFP) logic equations which are definitely outside the focus 
of this thesis. These equations are solved by the Succinct Solver which is a tool for 
solving constraints specified in ALFP. The Succinct Solver computes the minimum 
solution satisfying the input equations and returns a result. This is transformed by the 
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LySa-tool to a readable version of the estimate (,  , ). The LySa-tool makes use 
of the Succinct Solver and the Standard ML of  New Jersey.  The overall process is 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Analysis process. 
4.4.1 Analysis of the WMF Protocol 
We have defined the protocol narration of the WMF protocol in Table 1.1 of the first 
chapter  and the extended narration of this protocol in Table 3.4 of the third chapter. 
Here we give the LySa model for the WMF protocol in Table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4: LySa model of the WMF. 
 
 
This model is coded in LySa and after the LySa tool processes the analysis gives en 
estimate where  =∅. The variable environment is given in Table 4.5 below. 
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Table 4.5: The variable environment for the WMF analysis. 
 
 
In Table 4.5,  V● denotes any value that the attacker has the knowledge of. The error 
component  =∅ ensures that no encryptions/decryptions occur at unexpected 
places. So, the last row of the table means that the attacker does not possess the 
knowledge of the Secret. But the attacker can send out a message of any length 
matching any term receiving values, and the names the process matches on are all 
free names so the attacker has the knowledge to create messages on the right form. 
Therefore, All variables bound to values received directly on the network, which 
means that they are not decrypted from values received on the network, can all be 
bound to anything inside the attacker V●. However, the attacker does not posses 
enough information to create encrypted messages to be decrypted by legitimate 
principals which would to an error in  of the form (  ●,  ), where   is any point in 
the LySa-process. In the same manner, the attacker does not posses enough 
information to decrypt any of the encrypted terms from the message on the network 
by legitimate principals which would to an error in  of the form (  ,  ●).  
The analysis show that the messages to be kept secret are not leaked to the attacker 
and the messages are originated and received by intended principals. But this does 
not verify the authenticity and confidentiality of the WMF protocol. Because, the 
LySa model in Table 4.4 describes a simple scenario with one initiator A, one server 
S and one responder B which limits the attacker to act as a passive attacker. 
Therefore, we need a more flexible scenario, where a number of initiators Ii, and a 
number of responders Ij exists. The difference between the simple and the flexible 
scenarios are shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: Different WMF scenarios. 
 
In the flexible scenario, all initiators, responders and the attacker share keys with the 
server S. Therefore, the attacker is able to act as either an initiator or as a responder 
in a protocol run. The LySa model of the flexible WMF scenarios is described in 
Table 4.6. 
In the first rows of the model, it can be seen that initially shared keys KAi and KBj are 
restricted for the valid principals 1  i , j  n. The keys KA0 and KB0 belongs to the 
attacker are not restricted, therefore KA0 and KB0 are threaded as free names in the 
analysis. 
The indexing of the principals is important. The initiating principal Ii is indexed from 
i = 1 and j = 1 since we only describe the legitimate part of the system. The server S 
is indexed from i = 0 and j = 0 so that the attacker can act as either a initiator or a 
responder in the protocol. The responder Ij is indexed from i = 0 and j = 1 allowing 
the responder to actually receive messages from the attacker. The indices i and j 
cannot be equal, because that would lead principals to authenticate themselves.  
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Table 4.6: The Flexible WMF scenario. 
 
 
The result of the flexible WMF model is shown in Table 4.7, and it is much more 
different than the result of the simple model shown in Table 4.5. The error 
component  in the result is not empty, this means that some encryptions and 
decryptions have occurred at unexpected places. In the first line of Table  4.7, there 
are three types of pairs in the error components:  the first type includes  ● as the 
decryption point for example (A2i,j,  ●) and means that information encrypted at A2 
in any principal initiating the protocol can be decrypted by the attacker. When we 
look at the model in Table 4.6 we see that A2 is the place where the Secreti,j is 
encrypted and therefore the pair (A2i,j,  ●) in the error component implies that all 
secrets are known by the attacker. This is also clearly seen in the last row of the 
analysis result in Table 4.7. Second type of pairs includes  ● as the encryption point 
for example (  ● , B2i,j) and means that the attacker can send any information in his 
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knowledge V● to any responder Ij and make him believe that the information 
originated from the initiator Ii. This causes the variables that store such information 
contain values from the attacker as shown in the second and third rows of Table 4.7. 
Third type of pairs does not include  ● as neither the encryption nor the decryption 
point for example (A11,2 , S12,1) and means that messages encrypted in one run of the 
protocol can be decrypted in another run of the protocol. This can cause the situation 
that a secret meant for principal I1 could end up at principal Ij. Such a problem can be 
seen in the second and third lines of the analysis again. 
Table 4.7: The result of the flexible WMF analysis. 
 
 
Since the analysis is an over-approximation, the error component does not 
necessarily imply that there exist an error. In other words, the value in the error-
component  could come from a trace that is not actually possible. So, we have to 
find actual traces leading to the errors in the analysis. The trace in Table 4.8 leads to 
the error (A21,2,  ●).  In the line 1, the message intended from the initiating principal 
I1 to the server S which includes the session key K1,2 in the aim of establishing 
communication with principal I2 is eavesdropped by the attacker denoted by M. In 
the line 1’, the attacker modifies the second field of the message as if the principal I1 
wants to engage communication with I0 which is in fact the attacker himself. The 
server gets this message and sends the message 2 (includes the session key K1,2 but 
encrypted with the shared key of the attacker) to the intended responder of message 
1’ which s the attacker. So the attacker gets the session key, and now he is able to 
decrypt any messages send from I1 to I2. This is situation was indicated by (A21,2, ●) 
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Table 4.8: Trace of the error (A21,2,  ●). 
 
Using this session key, the attacker can cause different type of errors in the analysis, 
as shown in Table 4.9. In the first line, the attacker uses the session key he got in the 
first message, which is in fact a replay attack. This persuades the server that I1 has 
created at fresh key for communication with I2. In the second line, the server sends 
this session key to I2 who believes that it is shared with I1, but actually it is the 
attacker. After that the attacker is now able to impersonate I1, by sending false 
secrets to I2 as described in the line 3. This leads to the error (  ● , B21,2) since the 
secret that was believed to be encrypted by I1 and decrypted at B2 was in fact  
encrypted at the attacker. 
Table 4.9: Trace of the error (  ● , B21,2). 
 
 
 
The details of the analysis of the WMF protocol is discussed in [18, 13].  
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5. ANALYSIS OF IEEE 802.16 PKMV2 SA-TEK 3 WAY HANDSHAKE 
As we described in the section 2.3, our approach is based on checking the limits of 
robustness in IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 by removing enhancements in PKMv2 one by 
one, and in different combinations. Thus, we can see if some improvements are 
unnecessary and the result may lead us to a simplified by still strong and secure 
protocol. Our experiments are accomplished using the LySa-tool which runs with our 
LySa code. 
5.1 Experiments  
We based our model on John Mitchell’s simplified version (that was used in his 
security review together with IETF EAP Work Group) [25] of the IEEE 802.16 
PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake in section 2.4. After that we developed our LySa 
model  in section 3.2.3. 
We start with our model and try to simplify the model by removing components and 
analyzing with attacker to find flaws.  
5.1.1 The PKMv2 SA-TEK 3 Way Handshake 
In our base model of the protocol we have three messages each of them consisting of 
at least identities, nonces  and message authentication codes as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The base protocol narration. 
 
The LySa model for the protocol is shown in Table 5.2. First part of the model is the 
initiator, who is actually the BS in IEEE 802.16. Then comes the responder, who is 
the MS. The last part shows the attackers knowledge. This means that the analysis 
include an attacker as described in section 4.3. 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: na, nb, id, T, MAC{ na, nb, id, T}K 
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 Table 5.2: PKMv2 LySa Model 
 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
secure and the attacker couldn’t violate the authentication properties. 
5.1.2 Removing the Nonces 
In the first part of the experiments we will be dealing with the nonces in the second 
and the last message. The nonce na is the same nonce that was used in message 1 and 
message 2, therefore seems to be redundant. But we have to show it with the static 
analysis. The nonce nb seems to be convenient but we deal with it too. 
5.1.2.1 Removing nb in the Last Message 
We removed the nonce of B, nb, and now the protocol is as shown in Table 5.3. No 
doubt that this modification affects the MAC of the message three. In fact, this 
modification makes the na in message two meaningless, but we have to try and see 
the result. 
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Table 5.3: PKMv2 without nb in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: na, id, T, MAC{ na, id, T}K 
 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.4. The changes are in the 
initiators last output and the responders second input. 
Table 5.4: LySa model of PKMv2 without nb in message 3 
 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
still secure and the attacker still couldn’t violate the authentication properties even 
though we didn’t use the nonce of principal B in the last message. This is an 
interesting result because now the na in message two seems to be meaningless 
because there is no response for it. MAC’s seem to save the protocol to verify the 
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security properties. In addition, this is also an important result because it supports our 
assertion But we have to try the other combinations to conclude about the analysis. 
5.1.2.2 Removing na in the Last Message 
In this experiment, we removed the nonce of principal A, na, and now the protocol is 
as shown in Table 5.5. This nonce was sent to B in message one, and was responded 
by B in message two. Removing it from message three shouldn’t affect the result. 
Table 5.5: PKMv2 without na in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: nb, id, T, MAC{ nb, id, T}K 
 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.6. Similar to the previous 
experiment, the changes are in the initiators last output and the responders second 
input. 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
still secure and the attacker still couldn’t violate the authentication properties even 
though we didn’t use the nonce of principal A in the last message Actually, this 
result also supports our assertion and this is an optimized alternative to the protocol. 
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Table 5.6: LySa model of PKMv2 without na in message 3 
 
 
5.1.2.3 Removing  All the Nonces in  the Last Message 
In this experiment, we removed both na and nb in the base protocol as shown in 
Table 5.7. Again we did the necessary changes in the MAC. 
Table 5.7: PKMv2 without na and nb in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: id, T, MAC{ id, T}K 
 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.8. Similar to the previous 
experiment, the changes are in the initiators last output and the responders second 
input. 
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Table 5.8: LySa model of PKMv2 without na and nb in message 3 
 
This time we find violation of authentication properties. The result is given as:  
ψ = (a11 1, b31 1), (a31 1, b11 1), (a12 1, b32 1), (a32 1, b12 1), (a11 2, b31 2), (a31 2, b11 2), 
(a12 2, b32 2), (a32 2, b12 2) 
The results show that some encrypted values are decrypted in wrong places and some 
decrypted values were actually encrypted in the wrong places. The crypto-points are 
all from legitimate principals so there can be a replay attack. A possible trace of this 
error can be summarized as: the attacker eavesdropped the first message and he used 
the encrypted value in the first message, which is actually the MAC of the message, 
that he couldn’t decrypt in a reply attack. In the third message, he replayed the 
MAC’s, namely he used the MAC of message one in message three.  This is a flaw 
so we found a level that the protocol lost its robustness property.  
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5.1.2.4 Removing  All Nonces in the Last Message and nb in the Second Message 
In this experiment, we removed all the nonce of principal A from both second and 
third messages while removing the nonce of principal B from the third message. 
Thus we obtained the modified version of the protocol shown in Table 5.9. We did 
the necessary changes in the MAC fields of both message two and message three. 
Table 5.9: PKMv2 without na in message 3 and no nbs  
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, S, MAC{ na, id, S}K 
3. A  B: id, T, MAC{ id, T}K 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.10. Compared to the base 
mode, the initiator has changes in its only input and last output, whereas the 
responder has changes in its only output and second input. 
Table 5.10: LySa model of PKMv2 without na in message 3 and no nbs  
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( 1 1
n
i j   K ij  ) ( 1 1
n
i j   id ij ) 
 
1
n
i 0
n
j ! ( na ij ) 
  
  id ij , na ij , {{| id ij , na ij |} Hash }
1
ij
ij
A
K
[dest B 1ij ]  . 
 (na ij , id ij ; xS ij , xmac ij ). 
 decrypt xmac ij  as {{| na ij , id ij , xS ij |} Hash ;}
2
ij
ij
A
K
[orig B 2ij ] in 
 ( T ij )   id ij , T ij , {{| id ij , T ij |} Hash }
3
ij
ij
A
K
[dest B 3ij ]  .0 
 
1
n
j 0
n
i ! (id ij ; yna ij , ymac ij ) 
 decrypt ymac ij  as {{| id ij , yna ij |} Hash ;}
1
ij
ij
B
K [orig A
1
ij ] in 
 ( S ij )   yna ij , id ij , S ij , {{| yna ij , id ij , S ij |} Hash }
2
ij
ij
B
K [dest A
2
ij ]  . 
 (id ij ; yT ij , ymac ij ) 
 decrypt ymac ij  as {{| id ij , yT ij |} Hash ;}
3
ij
ij
B
K [orig A
3
ij ] in 0 
 
0
n
i
0
0j  K ij , K ji , id ij , id ji , Hash]  .0 
 
 
 54 
ψ = (a11 1, b31 1), (a31 1, b11 1), (a12 1, b32 1), (a32 1, b12 1), (a11 2, b31 2), 
(a31 2, b11 2), (a12 2, b32 2), (a32 2, b12 2) 
This result is same as the one in the previous experiment and the explanation is in 
use for this one too.  
5.1.3 Removing the Key Ids  
In this part of the experiments we will be dealing with the ids in the messages. The 
important point is that, all the id fields in the base protocol are the same and sent in 
plaintext. 
5.1.3.1 Removing the key id in the Last Message 
We removed the id from the last message and modified the MAC as needed. The 
protocol is now as shown in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11: PKMv2 without id in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: na, nb, T, MAC{ na, nb, T}K 
 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.12. The changes are in 
the initiators last output and the responders last input. 
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Table 5.12: LySa model of PKMv2 without id in message 3 
 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
still secure and the attacker still couldn’t violate the authentication properties even 
though we didn’t use the key id in the last message.  
5.1.3.2 Removing the key ids in the Second and the Third Message 
We removed the key ids in the last two messages and modified the MACs as needed. 
The protocol is now as shown in Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13: PKMv2 without ids in message 2 and 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, nb, S, MAC{ na, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: na, nb, T, MAC{ na, nb, T}K 
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The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.14. The changes are in 
the initiators last output and the responders last input. 
Table 5.14: LySa model of PKMv2 without ids in message 2 and 3 
 
 
Now we have found violation of authentication properties. The result is given as:  
ψ = (b21 1, b31 1), (a31 1, a21 1), (b22 1, b32 1), (a32 1, a22 1), (b21 2, b31 2), (a31 
2, a21 2), (b22 2, b32 2), (a32 2, a22 2), (a31 0, a21 0), (a32 0, a22 0), (b20 2, b30 
2), (b20 1, b30 1) 
This result shows that we cannot remove both ids in the protocol.   
5.1.4 Removing Nonces and the Key Ids  
In this part of the experiments we will be dealing with both the key ids and the 
nonces in the messages. We will only use the successful results in section 5.1.2 and 
5.1.3. 
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5.1.4.1 Removing the key id and nb in the Last Message 
We removed the id and nb from the last message and modified the MAC as needed. 
The protocol is now as shown in Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15: PKMv2 without id and nb in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: na, T, MAC{ na, T}K 
 
The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.16. The changes are in 
the initiators last output and the responders last input. 
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Table 5.16: LySa model of PKMv2 without id and nb in message 3 
 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
still secure and the attacker still couldn’t violate the authentication properties even 
though we didn’t use the key id and nb in the last message.  
5.1.4.2 Removing the key id and na in the Last Message 
We removed the id and na from the last message and modified the MAC as needed. 
The protocol is now as shown in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17: PKMv2 without id and na in message 3 
1. A  B: id, na, MAC{ id, na}K 
2. B  A: na, id, nb, S, MAC{ na, id, nb, S}K 
3. A  B: nb, T, MAC{ nb, T}K 
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The LySa model after the modification is shown in Table 5.18. The changes are in 
the initiators last output and the responders last input. 
Table 5.18: LySa model of PKMv2 without id and na in message 3 
 
The result of the analysis is: no violations possible. This means that the protocol is 
still secure and the attacker still couldn’t violate the authentication properties even 
though we didn’t use the key id in the last message.  
5.2 Fixing the Violations  
As seen in the experiments, in some modified versions of the protocol, violations are 
seen and the problems occur in the encryption/decryption parts of the protocol, which 
are in fact the message authentication codes in our model. In this part, we go one step 
further and fix the errors and present secure versions of the protocols that had 
violations.  
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We change the implementation of message authentication codes. We hash the 
messages along with the key and a sequence number. The sequence numbers ensure 
messages within a single session cannot be confused with one another. We model 
thin LySa by using a sequence of public values Seq1, Seq2, . . . and each message 
will be encrypted along with one of these numbers using the current session key. For 
example the i'th message transfer from principal A to principal B will be: 
 
5.2.1 Fix for Removing All the Nonces in  the Last Message  
Adding sequence numbers into the message authentication codes fix the violations in 
the version without nonces in message three. The LySa model of this version is given 
below. The LySa results are explained in section 5.2.4. 
Table 5.19: LySa model of the fixed version of the experiment 5.1.2.3. 
 
 
5.2.2 Fix for Removing All Nonces in the Last Message and nb in the Second 
Message  
Adding sequence numbers into the message authentication codes fix the violations in 
the version without nonces in message three and nb in message two. The LySa model 
of this version is given below. The LySa results are explained in section 5.2.4. 
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Table 5.20: LySa model of the fixed version of the experiment 5.1.2.4. 
 
 
5.2.3 Fix for Removing the key ids in the Second and the Third Message  
Adding sequence numbers into the message authentication codes fix the violations in 
the version without key ids in message two and three. The LySa model of this 
version is given below. The LySa results are explained in section 5.2.4. 
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Table 5.21: LySa model of the fixed version of the experiment 5.1.3.2. 
 
5.2.4 LySa Results for the Fixes  
The LySa results of the fixed models for the modifications that caused violations are 
all the same: no violations possible. This means that these versions of the protocol 
are again secure. Since the problems occurred from the message authentication 
codes, changing the implementations of them fixed the violations. As a simple note, 
this was not included in our proposal at the beginning. Therefore, the fixes are just 
for showing how to fix a violation about message authentication codes. 
5.3 Analysis Results  
As seen in the experiments, we established the analysis in four steps. First of all, we 
analyzed the base model. We had successful results for the base model. Then we 
removed the nonces starting from the ones in the last message. The results for nonces 
showed us that removing either the nonce of the principal A or the principal B does 
not change the secure standing of the protocol. But removing them both, causes 
problems especially replay attacks. After that we checked the nonces in the second 
message but removing them also caused problem so we stopped. We didn’t try some 
combinations such as removing nb in message since it was the first usage of it. As a 
third step we removed the key ids which were always the same in three messages and 
sent in plaintext. Removing the last id still preserved the robustness, but doing more 
with the ids caused problems. Finally we got the secure paths from the nonce 
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experiments and the id experiments and merged them to get a combined path which 
is optimized but secure. Thus we found out that removing the id and one of the 
nonces does not cause any flow. Whereas, removing both nonces in the last message 
or removing a nonce from the second message with a missed id makes the protocol 
fail. 
As a result we may have a simplified but still strong and secure protocol if we make 
the optimizations that we found successful in our analysis. In addition, reducing the 
number of fields will also have better performance results since the bandwidth usage 
is also important in wireless networks. 
Another result of this analysis is that the lengths of the fields are also very important 
since the error components in the static analysis show that the same MACs can be 
created when the implementation take some field lengths the same. 
As we mentioned in the static analysis chapter, the errors in this analysis does not 
always show that the protocol has flaws, whereas the successful runs of the analysis 
are always successful. The reason of this behavior is the over-approximation of the 
analysis. 
In conclusion, the results of the static analysis support our assertion that the PKMv2 
can be improved by optimization without any loss of security. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Security is important in all types of data communications but it is an essential and 
also a tough subject in wireless networks. The IEEE 802.16 standard which is 
certified as WiMAX is the strongest competitor of 3G and still rapidly growing. In 
this thesis, the latest version of the standard, the IEEE 802.16e-2005 is considered. 
This version of standard's most important feature is mobility but it also has 
significant improvements in security. The reason for such security improvements in 
this version was the big failure in the previous security protocol PKMv1. Similar to 
the drawbacks in IEEE 802.11b which was fixed in IEEE 802.11i, the drawbacks of 
IEEE 802.16-2004 is now fixed by IEEE 802.16e-2005.  
In this thesis, the studies are divided into four groups. First of all, the security 
sublayers of the current and former IEEE 802.16 protocols are studied. These studies 
led us to the PKM protocol which has two main issues: an 
Authentication/Authorization scheme to establish a shared authorization key, and a 
second scheme to distribute the traffic encryption keys. The latest version of the 
protocol, PKMv2, leaves the first issue to de fact standards which are proved to be 
secure such as RSA and EAP, therefore fixes the ambiguities in the first version. The 
second issue was very weak in the PKMv1 and is highly strengthened by the PKMv2 
named as PKMv2 SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake. PKMv1 had many missing security 
features, whereas PKMv2 is over-strengthened which does not mean that PKMv2 is 
the ultimate secure protocol. The truth is that, it has definitely degraded efficiency 
since it needs more sources and time for the security features it has. The assertion of 
this thesis is that, PKMv2 can still pursue its security with less features than it has. 
The redundancy in the PKMv2 is being questioned. 
The second part of the work is about LySa process calculus. LySa allows 
communication protocols to be specified and annotated allowing for validation of 
authentication properties. To make the static analysis of the IEEE 802.16 PKMv2 
SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake protocol we had to formalize it in LySa calculus which 
is based on pi calculus. The next part of the work is the static analysis method. Static 
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analysis is successfully used for automatically validating security properties of 
classical protocols. Using these three parts of work, we were able to derive a model 
of the protocol and describe it using LySa and carry out a static analysis of the LySa 
process using the static analysis tool LySa-tool.  
Last part of our work was the analysis to see the limits of robustness in IEEE 802.16 
PKMv2. The way we do that was removing the extras and the improvements in 
PKMv2 one by one, and in different combinations. We wanted to see when the 
robustness would be lost and also if there were some unnecessary  improvements. 
Since this was an over-strengthened protocol we could try to provide better 
efficiency with less strength. So that the result may lead us to a simplified by still 
strong and secure protocol. 
We established many experiments and took the important ones here. Our analysis 
results shows that some fields are unnecessary and does not affect security at all. 
Special combinations of those fields are also redundant and shown by our 
experiments. This results support our ideas about optimizing the protocol. Thus, 
according to our static analysis results based on LySa process calculus, we can say 
that this protocol is secure enough itself and will still be secure even though some 
components are removed. The limits of the robustness is measured and given in the 
analysis results. In addition, the possible flaws when this limits are exceeded are 
mentioned.  
The  soundness of the analysis based on Lysa is proved in previous studies, 
especially in [13] and [26]. The method of the analysis is described in details in [20]. 
As a future work, the former parts of the PKMv2 can be modeled and analyzed so 
that  the results can be joined with the results of this thesis and a security analysis 
framework can be developed. 
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